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due after the forfeiture arose, he thereby waives the forfeiture, recog­
nizes the continuance of the tenancy and cannot maintain his pro- 
ccdings for possession; he cannot affirm the lease and at the same 
tim e seek possession. But in the Bagshaw case-0 it was stated that each 
tim e the rent reserved by the lease remained unpaid for fifteen days 
after it should have been paid a new right of forfeiture arose. Thus, 
there can be several rights of forfeiture upon which the landlord can 
rely, and the acceptance of rent by him might not affect all or any of 
them , and so long as he has one right to forfeit lie can act on it and 
accept any rent due before the last right arose.
It is submitted that the position is the same with regard to the 
7-day period if the proceeding:; under Part III  are to be looked upon as 
proceedings for possession. So, in the present case, where the rent was 
$37 per month and the landlord acceptcd two payments of $20 each, if 
it is assumed that these payments were in satisfaction of the first 
m onth’s rent which fell in arrears and part of the second, the landlord 
did not waive the forfeiture because a new right to forfeit arose seven 
days after the third m onth’s rent fell due. In any event, a new right of 
forfeiture accrued fifteen days after the due date of the third m onth’s 
rent and this for the landlord’s benefit unless the position is taken that 
by proceeding under Part III the landlord waives any right he at law 
would acquire by the operation of s. 8.
Franklin O . Leger, III Law LT.N.B.
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Contract — Enforceable Contract — Meaningless Clause — 
Rejection
In delivering his judgment in the case of Hillas and C o. Ltd . v. 
Arcos L td .1 Lorcf W right declared:
Business men often record the most im portant agreements in crude and 
summary fashion; modes of expression sufficient and clear to them in 
the course of their business may appear to those unfam iliar with the 
business far from complete or precise. It is accordingly the duty of the 
Court to construe such documents fairly and broadly, w ithout being too 
astute or subtle in finding defects.
In the case presently under discussion, three judges of the English 
C ourt of Appeal were faced with just such a problem. T h e  plaintiffs 
wrote a letter to defendant offering to buy from him  three thousand 
tons of steel reinforcing bars. A few days later the defendant replied 
by letter, accepting the offer. T h e seller broke his contract ana the
1. (1932), 147 L.T. 503.
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buyer claimed damages. T he seller set up the defence that a sentence 
in the defendant's letter of acceptance had the effect of preventing 
the formation of a contract. T h e  words in question were: “ I assume 
that we arc in agreement that the usual conditions of acceptance will 
apply” . There were no “usual conditions” in operation between the 
parties and defendant contended that there was nothing to which 
those words could apply and that they were thus meaningless, and 
that, therefore, there had never been a contract. T h e  C ourt, however, 
thought differently and declared that the clause being meaningless 
it ought to be ignored and the contract upheld. Lord Justice Denning 
went even further and made a distinction between a meaningless clause 
and a clause which has yet to be agreed.
T h e  vexatious problem of uncertainty and meaningless terms in 
contracts has long plagued the courts. Nearly all text book writers 
state the general principle that the parties must make their own con­
tract . . . .  “the law requires the parties to make their own contract; 
it will not make a contract for them out of terms which are indefinite 
or illusory”
Thus in May and Butcher Ltd. v. T h e K ing/ V iscount Dunedin
said:
T o  be a good contract there must be a concluded bargain, and a con­
cluded contract is one which settles everything that is necessary to be 
settled and leaves nothing to be settled by agreem ent between the 
parties.-*
So, too, in Bishop and Baxter, Ltd. v. Anglo-Eastern Trading and In­
dustrial Co. L td .5 which involved the phrase “subject to . . . war clause”, 
the C ourt of Appeal held that as there was no evidence that the 
parties had any particular war clause in mind and as the war clause 
took many forms the parties were not ad idem and there was no bind­
ing contract.
In the case of Scammell v. Ouston0 the traditional attitude of the 
Courts was reiterated. It was held that when the purchaser of a motor 
van traded in an old vehicle and agreed to pay the “balance of pur­
chase price . . . .  on hire purchases terms over a period of 2 years”, the 
allegea agreement was unenforceable for uncertainty.
At the same time there is authority for the view that the presence 
of an unintelligible clause does not of itself render a contract unenforce­
able. Re. Vince. E x  parte Baxter7 is an example. A loan agreement 
was held to be valid wnile one of its clauses “being unintelligible must 
be treated as void”.
T h e  case of Hillas and Co. Ltd. v. Arcos L td .8 analysed carefully 
the whole problem and resulted in Lord W rig h t’s now well known
2. Anson, Pr inciples  of th e English Law  of Contract , 20th Ed., p. 21.
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declaration cited in the opening paragraph of this com m ent. The 
case involved an agreement for the sale of Russian softwood timber, 
the agreement containing an option clause for the further sale of 
timber. T h e  objection had been that the option clause contained no 
details as to size, quality or shipping terms of the timber. As has al­
ready been noted, Lord W right felt that an agreement is enforceable 
when the contractual intention is clear but the contract is silent on 
some detail.
Canadian decisions on this problem have not been too numerous. 
Kelly v. W atson" involves a land sale, and uncertainty as to the terms 
of payment. Sir Louis Davies C .J. felt the courts should, if possible, 
without creating a new agreement, spell out one which they conclude 
from the evidence represents the real intention of the parties.
It is quite another thing, however, to make a new agreement for the 
parties as to which they themselves were never ad id em .!<»
It was held no such agreement could be made.
Tw o more recent Canadian cases arc DeLaval v. Bloomfield 11 and 
Thom son Groceries Ltd. v. S co tt12, both of which were heard in the 
Ontario Court of Appeal. T h e  latter was concerned with a sale of 
land for cash and a mortgage. There was uncertainty regarding the 
terms and duration of the mortgage, yet the contract was held to be 
valid. DeLaval v. Bloom field11 was a case in which the Court held that 
it could enforcc a contract for the sale of goods at the price of $400.00, 
payable: “$200.00 on November 1st, 1937, bal. to be arranged” .
W riting  in 1939,13, D . W . Gordon criticized this decision on the 
ground that such an attitude threatened to “loosen all principles that 
govern contract” . Dr. C . A. W right appended an incisive editorial 
note to this argument.14 Dr. W right begins by stating
T h e  view of the com m entator, to the effect that the parties arc them ­
selves masters of their own contractual obligations and that anything 
which the parties have not expressed cannot be enforced is probably 
the orthodox view. On the other hand, a sense of fair dealing, of com ­
mon business m orality, if you like, seems more and more to play a part 
in the law of contracts and render less im portant so-called principles 
based on abstract conceptions of contractual liability.
Viscount Dunedin in May and Butcher Ltd. v. The King15 is cited to 
the cffect that it is the ‘ essentials” which have to be determined by 
the parties and D r. W right adds that the Sale of Goods A ct makes 
stipulations as to tim e o f  payment not being of the essence of a con­
tract of sale. “T h is would seem in itself to support the decision of the 
O ntario Court of Appeal since there was undoubtedly a bargain in 
the sense of a contemplated sale of goods at a fixed price with merely
9. 11921), 61 S.C.R. 482.
10. Ibid, at p. 483.
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U.N.B.  LAW JOURNAL 65
the time of payment, that is a non-essential, left uncertain.” Dr. W right 
goes on to state that Hillas and Co. Ltd. v. Arcos Ltd .8 “indicates the 
tendency of modern cases to support commercial transactions even 
though there is theoretical uncertainty in some part.”
In Pollock On Contracts1'1 the learned author, after a discussion of 
main of the above cases, states concisely:
No doubt the principles that (i) if paities leave essential terms iu au 
agreem ent to be determ ined in a subsequent contract, the agreement is 
not a contract, but (ii) the Court must give effect to details unstated in 
a genuine contract., must occasionally be in close com petition in their 
application to particular cases; but to press for any statement of these 
principles more exact than Lord W right's*? is perilously near a demand 
for m echanization of all business contracts.
A perusal of the judgments in Nicolene Ltd. v. Simmonds18 and 
especially that of Lord Justice Denning, would seem to indicate that 
a neater distinction has been made without undesirable stereotyping.
T o  return to the case which forms the basis of this commentary, 
we have seen that the clause in question was “ I assume that we are 
in agreement that the usual conditions of acceptance apply” . As for 
the judgments themselves, Singleton L. J. stated:
T h e  words: I assume we are in agreem ent that the usual conditions of 
acceptance apply’ are, to my m ind, meaningless, and ought to be ignored. 
Counsel for the defendant further subm itted that we must give a meaning 
to all the words in the documents, but when parties are writing letters 
which are sometimes long it is not easy to give a meaning to all that 
they w rite .i*
Ilodson L .J. agreed and stated that there was an unqualified accept­
ance, the clause in question being meaningless.
It is when we read the judgment of Denning L. J. that we see that 
new light has been thrown upon the problem of uncertainty in con­
tracts. After briefly stating the facts Lord Justice Denning declares:
In my opinion a distinction must be drawn between a clause which is 
meaningless and a clause which is yet to be agreed. A clause which is 
meaningless can often be ignored, while still leaving the contract good, 
whereas a clause which has yet to be  agreed  may mean that there is no 
contract at all. because the parties have not agreed on all the essential 
terms. -<»
T h e  learned Lord Justice goes on to demonstrate, by reference to 
many of the cases cited in this com m ent, that his approach can be 
the explanation of them.
As I read it, lie  Vince. Ex parte B axter1 is an authority in support of 
what I have said. T h e  contract of loan itself was good, but the vague and 
unintelligible claim was rejected. T h e  other cases which were relied on 
go on to be explained on the ground that there was a clause yet to be
16. 13th Ed. p. 38.
17. 147 L.T. 593.
18. 11953] 1 All E.R. 822.
19. Ibid., at p. 824.
20. Ibid., at p. 825.
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agreed. In I.ove k  Stewart, Ltd. v. S. Instone k  C o.tt, where there was 
a strike clause yet to he agreed I.ord Sumner said at page 477, that the 
case was ‘one of continuing negotiations broken off in m edio’; in G. Scani- 
tnell k  S'epheu' I.td. v. Oustnti, where there were hire-purchase terms yet 
to be agreed. I.ord W right said 22 the ‘agreement was inchoate and never 
got beyond negotiations’. In Hisltop k  Baxter, Ltd. v. Anglo-Eastern T rad­
ing k  Industrial Co. L td .3 , where there was a war clause yet to be agreed, 
this Court held that, until the parties agreed upon a particular form of 
war clause, there could be no consensus ad idem. As I read them , those 
were all cases where there was a clause yet to be agreed, the m atter was 
still in negotiations, and there was no concluded con tract.23
At this point Lord Justice Denning pauses to say a word about 
another recent decision reported in the same volume of the All England 
Lay Reports. He cites tne case of British Electrical & Associated In­
dustries (Cardiff), Ltd. v. Patley Pressings Ltd.24 In that case a 
contract note contained the clause “subject to force majeure condi­
tions” . M cN air J. declared that it was “so vague and uncertain as to 
be incapable of any precisc meaning”, and further that there was no 
enforceable agreement upon which the plaintiff could rely. Lord 
Justice D enning’s com m ent on this case was:
I should have thought that it could be ignored without im pairing the 
validity of the contract. It was clearly severable from the rest of the 
contract, whereas the term in G. Scam mell k  X epliew  v. Ouston 25 was not. 
2«
W h a t Lord Justice Denning would appear to be saying is that if there 
is a meaningless clause the contract will be enforceable if the clause 
can be severed from the contract. O f course, if there is an essential 
clause yet to be agreed then the contract will be unenforceable. Lord 
Justice D enning concluded by finding that the clause in the present 
case is meaningless; however, it is clearly severable from the rest of the 
contract so that “ the contract should be held to be good and the 
clause should be ignored.”
D enning L. J. has produced an intelligent refinement of the ques­
tion of uncertainty, which recognizes the needs of the commercial 
world.
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